PRELUDE: i was going through my box-o'-goodies (a.k.a. box of old notes, papers, readings, and crap wipers) from college to look for a photocopy of my brith certificate, when i came across this thick booklet entitled, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS. couldn't help but get nostalgic. i ended up reading a few chapters from one of my favorite books (yeah... i loved it so much. aristotle really knew his shit back then...), and began writing some thoughts on the virtue of continence. ha ha ha. and so.... i wish to warn you about this entry: there is quite some seriousness up ahead (i love how philosophy stirs the idealistic nature in me... heehee).
continence and the continent manthough opposites, there exists the presupposition that the desires of virtue and vice are in accordance with choice, whether it may be the right or wrong one. is it possible, though, to know the right thing to do and not desire it, and thus act contrary to what one knows to be right? socrates (according to aristotle) denied this possibility. in his understanding of man’s actions, we always desire what we believe to be good for us, and would never act against such a belief. what makes us go wrong in action is when we hold false beliefs about our own good. we cannot fully realize what would make us happy and then fail to act in accordance with that realization. this seems to conflict with the way human beings live out their lives.
this (conflict) is the condition of incontinence, the weakness of will or lack of self-restraint. its primary form is prompted by the desire for pleasure, which actually affects the body and seems to have the power to overcome our reasoning about the right courses to follow. in this primary form, incontinence occupies the same place as the vice of indulgence (mmm hmmm...), which involves excessive desire for bodily pleasures (hmmmm hmmmmmm...). they differ however, because in the case of a vice like indulgence, desire and reason are in harmony, although faulty in reasoning. reason is completely taken over – having one’s mind clouded by passion and desire – with thoughts driven by these as the right actions to be done. on the other hand, in the incontinent condition, reason has not been completely taken over – one possesses correct reasoning about the right thing to do but is unable to carry out because of the strength of the conflicting desire for pleasure.
if incontinent conflict is indeed possible, there is also the contrary, positive state of self-restraint (continence), in which a person knows the right thing to do, but nevertheless desires something else and therefore has to hold back his desire in order to act in accordance with what he knows is right. this is a great achievement, but falls short of the ideal of virtue, where the desires must be at par with reason.
aristotle considers what it must mean "to know," that we cannot truly
know what is good for us and, presupposingly, cannot desire it. such knowledge is never just a matter of saying what should be done, like an actor reading out lines on stage. nor can it be just a matter of being informed about some universal rule, as how newspapers report to its readers updated local and international laws and house bills. it is an internal realization,
fully actualized, and eventually applied to the everyday circumstances in which one lives his life. it is incoherent to imagine someone not desiring, and then acting against this sort of realization that a certain course of action will ultimately lead to one’s happiness. this kind of knowledge of one’s own good, fully actualized, and eventually applied to the circumstances of his life, is prudence or practical wisdom. and the person who attains such is the continent man. he may be old, organic-smelling with white hair, or dying... but he is eternally revered for such an achievement.